INTRODUCTION
Flexibility of origins for artefacts is a thesis that holds that artefacts allow for slight variations in their origins. Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon's views, endorsement of this thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke's theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4.
One of the essential features of Peacocke's account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which determine the set of possible worlds. These principles divide into a set of first-order principles, and a single second-order principle. In turn, the first-order principles divide into the Modal Extension Principles (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles.
Regarding the modal status of the first-order principles, the account is explicitly committed to the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true, adding that there is nothing in the account that guarantees their necessity. The contingency of the Constitutive Principles would amount, as we will see, to the denial of S4, and Peacocke's considerations for committing himself neither to their necessity, nor to S4, allude precisely to Salmon's views on the consequences of flexibility of origins. More specifically, he seems to share Salmon's argument from flexibility of origins to the denial of S4.
Here, however, I show that, in the way in which the PrincipleBased Account is presented in Being Known, the Constitutive Principles are necessary; in particular, that their contingency is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and that this makes the account validate S4. Also, I show that, compatibly with their necessity (and the validation of S4), Peacocke's account still leaves room for accommodating intuitions about flexibility of origins, which makes it a case against Salmon's argument from flexibility to the denial of S4.
Salmon (1981) argues for the non-transitivity of the accessibility relation among worlds in order to solve the Four Worlds Paradox, constructed under the assumption of flexibility of origins. In his argument, he assumes that the individuative essences of artefacts change from world to world. This (controversial) assumption is consistent in Salmon's framework, but, as we will see, it is not so in Peacocke's modal approach. On the face of it, I suggest that we should in general be more reluctant to Salmon's way of motivating the non-transitivity of the accessibility relation among worlds; specially, because there are alternative ways of solving the Four Worlds Paradox which do not require the denial of S4. One such alternative has been offered by Williamson (1990) . His solution requires no specifically modal commitments, and is thereby compatible with transitivity, since it does not deny that artefacts keep their individuative essences constant across worlds.
The general conclusion of the paper will be that, if Peacocke's Principle-Based Account is to keep the recursivity of MEP, then, to the extent that we want the account to accommodate the intuitions about flexibility of origins, we should not do so via Salmon's treatment (since it renders the account inconsistent), but rather via a treatment along the lines of Williamson's, and keeping S4. As we will see, the account we end up with once these intuitions have been consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some
